The effect on economic growth for countries undergoing
the transition in the period of observation is insignificant although it tends
to be negative and larger in absolute value and size than the average effect
for the full of pre-transition countries [12]. The increase in population
growth is the largest for countries shifting from low-income and middle-income
transition. This has the largest negative population effect on the income per
capita [13]. Concerning the economic transition in crude birth rates, the
effect of life expectancy on lower fertility, and lower population growth is
positive but insignificant over the shorter horizon, but positive and
significant over the longer horizon (Bowser and Hill) [14]. The overall
increase in life expectancy represents a significant increase in the
probability that a nation undergoes fertility and demographic transition.
Improving health, such as reducing child and maternal mortality, will increase
the population. These are believed to reduce fertility, stabilize population
growth, and, over the long term, generate a demographic dividend through
reduced youth dependency. On the contrary, another argument for this may be the
increase in population, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where a large
population is a problem. The gains from better health could be offset by
falling per capita income if the economy is unable to accommodate the growing
population. On the other hand, diseases that do not lead to death but severely
affect a person's health and productivity have a negative impact on
productivity. Unless proper attention and care are given, HIV AIDS is an
example of the previous statement because the disease can make a patient
dependent on others. But when people living with HIV/AIDS receive adequate
medical treatment and adequate nutrition, they can work, perform and produce.
As prepared by Bloom [15].
Adult life expectancy, for example, by encouraging
parents to go to school, causes a significant increase in the productivity of
workers and a notable decline in fertility. These results are consistent with
recent empirical studies by Hansen and Lonstrup, which show that the causal
effect of life expectancy on per capita income growth is small and negative
before the demographic change, but afterward is very positive [16]. The model
follows the approach used in the literature, which explains the decline in fertility
by parents replacing the number of children with quality, see, and inter alia
[17]. However, this paper makes a clear distinction between the quality
provided to children and formal schooling, which in this model is only acquired
by parents. Sede and Ohemeng combine time allocation and the trade-off between
quantity and quality in a framework for fertility decisions [18]. Children are
seen as goods that are both consumed and produced by their parents. Parents
must decide how to spend their limited resources on the number and quality of
children and other goods and services. The production of children is limited by
consumer technology, the income potential of men and women, and the endowment
of women with time and their non-labour income. However, unlike the latter, the
possibility of a negative value is also taken into account. The impact of the
opportunity cost of childcare is considered to be negative on fertility. The
birth and care of children are very time-consuming, so the wages or value of women
in other non-market jobs should be considered as an opportunity cost of having
children. Because higher income is associated with a higher value of female
time, a negative relationship between income and fertility is expected. The
framework has been further expanded to accommodate a dynamic environment in
which decisions about fertility are made at multiple points in time. Muda have criticized the previously presented
neoclassical fertility frameworks. These consumer demand attitudes are not
appropriate for fertility because fertility is not always controlled. Actual
fertility may be higher or lower than desired fertility [19,20].
A framework that analyzes fertility should keep this
in mind. Another approach to fertility is through theories that discuss the
relationships between fertility, population growth, and income. In Solow's
model of economic growth (1956), an increase in population growth causes
capital per worker to decrease and thus has a negative impact on capital
accumulation and output per worker. High fertility leads to high population
growth and therefore lower income. Contrary to the previously presented models,
income does not affect fertility, but fertility does negatively affect income.
Bleakley combines growth theories and household/labour supply theories to
analyze the relationship between economic growth and fertility [21]. A positive
loop is discussed. An increase in capital per worker raises women's wages
because their productivity is more tied to capital. Increasing women's relative
income reduces fertility because it increases the cost of having children
through the time women have to spend having them. Low fertility leads to
further capital accumulation by the worker and strengthens the process. Low
fertility and income growth thus reinforce each other. Myrskyla discovered an
inversion of the relationship between HDI and TFR [22]. A negative association
was found among low- and medium-HDI countries, as predicted by the
household/labour supply models discussed above. In the more developed
countries, however, this pattern was reversed, and the more developed countries
recorded higher fertility rates. It is proposed to characterize the
relationship between HDI and TFR as a J-shape, with a turning point at an HDI
of 0.86. Jin fined a similar reversal in the relationship between economic
development and birth-robust fertility shift [23]. By decomposing GDP per
capita, it is found that female employment is associated with declines in
fertility. They also point out that fertility rates can only be partially
explained by economic developments and underline the importance of
institutional factors. Population growth and high fertility rates in
resource-poor environments can pose challenges for both society and
individuals. A growing population can affect the well-being of that population
in terms of socioeconomic socio-economic development, environmental
sustainability, sustainability, and resource supply. Resource-poor countries
with growing populations face the challenge of creating jobs for emerging
workers while their governments lack the resources to meet the rising demand
for services and infrastructure (United Nations Population Fund; 2012). The
effects of high fertility are also challenging for individuals. When many
children are born to one mother, it places an economic burden on her household
and increases the likelihood that her family will fall (JAMA 2006,
295:18091823). In families that do not
have sufficient adequate resources for education, nutrition, nutrition, and
health care, children - especially girls - may be forced to drop out of school
and marry early. High fertility also increases the risk of having a child being
born prematurely or with low birth weight and stunting as it grows, and preterm
birth increases the maternal health risk for mothers’ risks (World Bank; 2005).
Demographic transition describes a widely observed
phenomenon where the population transitions from high levels of mortality and
fertility to low levels of mortality and fertility. This transition is marked
by an initial decline in child morale due to improved infrastructure, health
system developments, and socioeconomic improvements, followed years later by a
decline in fertility rates. Rwanda was an exception (Popul Dev Rev) [24]. Rapid
improvements in health systems, infrastructure, and social programs over the
past decade have placed Rwanda in a rapid fertility transition. Between 2005
and 2010, the under-five mortality rate was halved from 152 to 76 deaths per
1000 live births, representing one of the fastest improvements in infant
mortality in human history. This decline in fertility and contraceptive use in
Rwanda coincides with a significant change in government officials' attitudes
toward family planning in the context of economic development policies. Given
that Rwanda has the highest population density of any African country (416
people per square kilometer with an annual population growth rate of 2.6%
(National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda; 2012), smaller families and
limited population growth became priorities for individual well-being and
national progress. Officials then launched widespread campaigns to change
public attitudes toward acceptance of small families, with the informal goal of
bringing the total fertility rate to fewer than 4 children per woman [25].
Following the introduction of compulsory free primary education and in response
to the rising cost of living, the government has launched awareness campaigns
to encourage couples to have only as many children as the family can feed, raise
and support. This was reinforced at the community level with community health
workers and community leaders in monthly Community works meetings. Despite this
major shift in fertility, there are many families in Rwanda who still have
large families; more than 20% of women between the ages of 15 and 49 have
currently had five or more births. Rwanda is undergoing a major demographic
transition that is setting the course for the country's economic development
and bucking trends in a region of slow fertility transition. Understanding
predictors of fertility can support the development of policies and
interventions that both help families achieve their desired fertility and
inform government economic policies and infrastructure development plans.
Findings can also inform fertility policies and programming elsewhere in
sub-Saharan Africa. This article examines some of the determinants of fertility
rates in Rwanda, looking separately at women who have ever been married/living
together and women who have never been married.
Research gaps
The empirical review sheds light on various factors
influencing fertility rates and their implications for economic growth and
population dynamics. However, there is a notable gap in research specifically
addressing the impact of fertility on life expectancy in Rwanda. While existing
studies have explored the relationship between fertility and economic growth,
the focus has primarily been on economic consequences rather than demographic
health outcomes such as life expectancy. Economic transitions, including
improvements in healthcare and education, influence fertility rates,
subsequently affecting economic growth [12]. Despite this, there's limited
research directly examining the impact of fertility on life expectancy within
Rwanda. Moreover, the review underscores the multifaceted nature of fertility
decisions influenced by socioeconomic status, healthcare access, and cultural
norms [14]. While some studies suggest a negative association between fertility
rates and economic development, others indicate a more nuanced relationship,
with factors like women's empowerment and education playing vital roles. The
demographic transition in Rwanda, marked by rapid improvements in healthcare
and infrastructure, offers a unique context for investigating the
fertility-life expectancy relationship. Comprehensive studies focusing on this
relationship are needed to fill the research gap and inform evidence-based
policies for population health and sustainable development in Rwanda [4].
The demographic transition
theory
The Demographic Transition Theory, proposed by Warren
Thompson in 1929, offers a framework for understanding the historical shifts in
population dynamics as societies undergo economic and social development.
According to this theory, societies typically transition through four stages,
each characterized by distinct patterns of fertility, mortality, and population
growth. In the initial stage, known as Stage 1, both birth rates and death
rates are high, resulting in minimal population growth. This stage is typical
of pre-industrial societies where limited access to healthcare, sanitation, and
education contributes to high mortality rates, particularly among infants and
children. As societies progress to Stage 2, improvements in healthcare, sanitation,
and living conditions lead to a significant reduction in mortality rates,
particularly among infants and children. However, birth rates remain high,
resulting in rapid population growth. The transition to Stage 3 occurs as
societies experience further economic development, urbanization, and
improvements in education and access to contraception. In this stage, birth
rates begin to decline as individuals choose to have fewer children due to
increased opportunities for education, employment, and urban living [26].
Finally, in Stage 4, both birth rates and death rates are low, resulting in a
stable population size or even population decline in some cases. This stage is
characterized by advanced healthcare systems, widespread access to
contraception, and a high level of urbanization. The Demographic Transition
Theory suggests that as societies progress through these stages, fertility
declines play a significant role in shaping population age structures and life
expectancy [26].